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Croatian contemporary history is marked by controversial issues, and even 
though many years have now gone by, some still seek to manipulate these issues 
for their own ends.  The Bleiburg tragedy and the postwar “death marches” are 
frequently brought up in this sense in the daily press and elsewhere. These 
issues are also discussed in historiography, which still appears unable to deal 
with those topics properly. To do so, it is therefore first necessary to identi-
fy the events included in these topics. The Bleiburg tragedy includes the sur-
rounding and capture of German and Croatian troops who were withdrawing 
through Slovenia toward Austria (Bleiburg) at the end of the World War II, the 
extradition of prisoners from the Viktring POW camp, and the “death march-
es” that followed, which are also called  the “Ways of the cross”.
During the last days of WW II members of the Allied forces created their 
own spheres of control, often ignoring the destiny of the defeated party.  The 
postwar period called for individuals able to carry out the “final struggle with 
the enemy”.  Even today, the number of losses during those days cannot be 
clarified.  Previous interpretations by Croatian and Yugoslav historians are 
often subjective and ignored the question of responsibility for the crimes com-
mitted then.1 On the other hand, members of the Croatian emigration tried to 
present their view of the truth, but their efforts, while often well-intentioned, 
also included inaccuracies, creating additional problems for contemporary 
scholars. During the 1990’s some new efforts have been made, but even after 
fifteen years we have no concrete answers. Indeed, the issues are still far from 
being resolved.
Final advance of the Allied forces and the withdrawal of Commander 
Alexander Löhr’s Army Group E,2 caused a significant reduction of the com-
* Martina Grahek Ravančić, M.A., Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb, Croatia
1 Such interpretations can be found in the majority of the studies produced on this topic by 
Yugoslav historiography. E.g.: Basta Milan, Rat je završen 7 dana kasnije (Zagreb: Globus, 1976); 
Brajović Petar S., Konačno oslobođenje, (Sjećanja i obrade) (Zagreb: Spektar, 1983); Za pobe-
du i slobodu – Završne operacije za oslobođenje Jugoslavije (učesnici govore), ed. Ivo Matović 
(Beograd: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1986).    
2 Ernest Bauer, “General Löhr i kapitulacija njemačke vojske pred Bleiburgom”, Hrvatska 
revija, 4(80) (December 1970): 741-751; E. Bauer, “General Löhr i događaji oko Bleiburga”, 
in: 50 godina Bleiburga, ed. Jozo Marević, Zagreb 1995, p. 101-105; Erich Schmidt – Richberg, 
Der Endkampf auf dem Balkan, Die Operationen der Heeresgruppe E von Griechenland bis zu 
den Alpen, (Heidelberg: Scharnhorft Buchkameradschaft, 1955), p. 89.-160.; Franz Schraml, 
Hrvatsko ratište (Zaprešić: Brkić i sin, 1993), p. 259.
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bat zone in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH - Nezavisna Država 
Hrvatska,).3 Five army corps of the Croatian army were still engaged with 
Partisan forces, but the number of soldiers in these units at the end of 1944 
and in the beginning of 1945 is still unknown. According to the first figures 
available, at the end of 1944 the entire Croatian army numbered 209,000 indi-
viduals, but due to a permanent lack of reserves the real number was more 
likely around 179,000.4 Similar assessments are accepted by most authors of 
both the Croatian emigration and domestic authors.5 Some authors mention 
considerably lower number of victims.6 Davor Marijan, who has consulted the 
intelligence reports of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army (NOV 
- Narodno-oslobodilačka vojska) and the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia 
(PO -  Partizanski odredi) from 9 December 1944,7 notes a permanent decline 
in Croatian armed forces by the end of 1944. He concludes that “the quantita-
tive condition of the entire Croatian armed forces […] could not have exceed-
ed 100,000 men.”8 This is probably the most accurate estimate we have, but like 
all estimates, even these figures are more guesswork than an accurate count. 
The advance of Partisan forces and the retreat of Croatian units triggered a 
massive movement of people from various parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and southern parts of Croatia.9  It is hard to determine whether civilians were 
forced to leave their homes, as Narcisa Lengel–Krizman claims,10 or whether, 
as available memoirs show, people were overtaken by a fear of Partisan units, 
because “[...] they were known for their brutality, crimes and wickedness.“11 
3 Vojna enciklopedija, vol. 9., s. v. “Svetski rat, Drugi” by Stjepan Kerečin, (Beograd 1975), 
446.-447.; Anđelko Mijatović, “Politički i vojnički kraj NDH”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest 23 
(1995), no. 3: 498.
4 Vjekoslav Vrančić, “Postrojenje i brojčano stanje Hrvatskih oružanih snaga u godinama 
1941. – 1945.”, Godišnjak Hrvatskog Domobrana, (1953): 141-169; Fedor Dragojlov, “Der Krieg 
1941. – 1945. auf dem Gebiete des Unabhängigen States Kroatien”, Allgemeine Schweizerische 
Militärzeitschrift, 5-7 (May – July 1956).
5 Ante Ljerkić, “Od Ivan Planine do Bleiburga – dokumenti o povlačenju hrvatske vojske 
1945. godine”, Drina, 2 (1963): 11; Vinko Nikolić, Frano Nevistić, ed., Bleiburška tragedija 
hrvatskog naroda, (München-Barcelona: Hrvatska revija, 1976 and 1977), 134; Zdravko Dizdar, 
“Brojitbeni pokazatelji odnosa vojničkih postrojbi na teritoriju Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 
1941. – 1945. godine”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest 24 (1996), no. 1-2: 161-197; Zbornik 
dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu jugoslavenskih naroda, tom. V., no. 34. 
(Beograd: Istorijski institut, 1966), 513-550; Josip Jurčević, Bleiburg: jugoslavenski poratni zločini 
nad Hrvatima (Zagreb: DIS: Udruga ratnih veterana Hrvatski domobran: Hrvatsko društvo 
političkih zatvorenika, 2005), 205, 207.
6 Mladenko Colić, “Kolaboracionističke oružane formacije u Jugoslaviji 1941.–1945. godine”, 
in: Oslobodilačka borba naroda Jugoslavije kao opštenarodni rat i socijalistička revolucija, 2 vols. 
(Beograd: 1977.), 2: 61-79.
7 Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu jugoslavenskih naroda, tom 
V, no. 36. (Beograd: Istorijski institut, 1986), 525-564.
8 Davor Marijan, “Ustaške vojne postrojbe” (MA, University of Zagreb, 2004), p. 66.
9 A. Ljerkić, “Od Ivan Planine do Bleiburga”, 43-44.
10 “Increasing number of enemy forces, followed by civilians who escaped partisans, because 
of theirs previous activities or mislead by Ustashi propaganda” arrived in Zagreb, Narcisa 
Lengel–Krizman, Zagreb u NOB-u (Zagreb: Globus, 1980), 276-277; Bogdan Krizman, Ustaše i 
Treći Reich II (Zagreb: Globus, 1986), 274.   
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Organized preparations for the withdrawal are rarely mentioned in literature, 
but many memoirs mention the fact that enormous number of people and 
vehicles blocked the roads.12 Vjekoslav Luburić attributed the main responsi-
bility for the withdrawal to the Germans, who left Herzegovina without mak-
ing previous arrangements with Croatian army authorities.13 Perhaps, but the 
final outcome of WW II was inevitable, and there was no time left for any sig-
nificant activities, had there been any substantial indications for such activi-
ties.
During the last days of the war, Zagreb was a “real beehive of manpow-
er, as if all Croatia has settled there.“14 Some have estimated that the num-
ber of its residents during May have been anywhere from “500,000 civil-
ians”,15 up to a million inhabitants.16 Regardless of the constant arrival of ref-
ugees into the Croatian capital, the figure of a million appears to be exagger-
ated. Nevertheless, it is clear that Zagreb could not accommodate all the refu-
gees.17 It “was a living example of a scared city”, whose inhabitants watched as 
“German troops just passed by.”18 The chaos was not the result of the fact that 
people knew what lay ahead; quite the contrary, they were moving towards an 
uncertain future. But the numerous refugees, whose exact number is impos-
sible to determine, put a great burden on the urban infrastructure and creat-
ed constant disorder.
The “Zvonimir Line”, the last planned defense line in the NDH, should have 
extended from Karlovac towards Dugo Selo, Vrbovac, Križevci, Koprivnica 
and the river Drava.19 This final concentration of the army was important, and 
11 Tomislav Obrdalj, “Kolona duha više od 70 kilometara”, in: Bleiburg 1945 – 1995., ed. 
Anđelko Mijatović, Zagreb 1995, 130-134; Stjepan Slipac, Svjedok. Moj križni put (Novi Travnik: 
Napredak, 1999), 17; Lucijan Kordić, “U danima srdžbe i gnjeva”, in: Bleiburg: uzroci i posljedice, 
ed. Vinko Nikolić, Zagreb 1998, 112; Darko Sagrak, Zagreb 1941. – 1945. (Zagreb: self pub-
lished, 1995), 185-199.
12 Vladimir Šklopan, “Povlačenje hrvatskih oružanih snaga u svibnju 1945.”, in: Od Bleiburga 
do naših dana, ed. Jozo Marević, Zagreb 1994, 78-79.
13 Vjekoslav Luburić, “The End of The Croatian Army”, in: Operation Slaughterhouse 
Eyewitness Accounts of Postwar Massacres In Yugoslavia, ed. John Ivan Prcela, Stanko Guldescu, 
(Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, 1970 and 1995), p. 43-71; J. I. Prcela, D. Živić, Hrvatski 
holokaust – dokumenti i svjedočanstva o poratnim pokoljima u Jugoslaviji (Zagreb: Hrvatsko 
društvo političkih zatvorenika, 2001 and 2005), p. 39. 
14 Lucijan Kordić, “U danima srdžbe i gnjeva”, in: Bleiburg: uzroci i posljedice, 116.
15 N. Lengel – Krizman, Zagreb u NOB-u, 53.
16 Bleiburška tragedija hrvatskog naroda, 29-32; Ante Beljo, Yu – genocide. Bleiburg, Death 
marches, Udba (Toronto: Northern Tribune Publishing; Zagreb: Croatian Information Centre, 
1995), 64-70.
17 Mato Rupić, Zdravko Dizdar, “Izjave zarobljenih i izručenih dužnosnika NDH i drugih 
pojedinaca o povlačenju hrvatske vojske i civila prema Austriji ”, in: Spomenica Bleiburg 1945. – 
1995., ed. Mirko Valentić, Zagreb 1995, 100.
18 N. Lengel – Krizman, Zagreb u NOB-u, 276; B. Krizman, Ustaše i Treći Reich II, 274.
19 E. Schmidt-Richberg, Der Endkampf auf dem Balkan, karta broj 5.; Fikreta Jelić – Butić, 
Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941. – 1945 (Zagreb: Liber: Školska knjiga,1977 and 1978), 
308-309. 
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preparations to deploy it along the Zvonimir Line started in the fall of 1944.20 
However, Schmit-Richberg concludes that maintenance of this line would have 
been impossible, given that in April 1945 it was not finished or even started in 
some sections.21 All this indicates that this was just another “weak link” that 
was trying to maintain the untenable.  
During the last days of WW II the NDH government was trying in vain to 
obtain support from Allied forces, which were coordinating their final opera-
tions with the Partisans. Seeking to put aside all previous differences with the 
Allies, the NDH government sought to organize a joint anticommunist action 
by negotiating with Serbian and Slovenian deputation.22 The NDH govern-
ment’s Memorandum to Allied forces sought to do the same, but the Croatian 
mission had no great significance.23 These efforts to persuade the Allies to 
view the NDH as a potential partner against the Communist Partisans yield-
ed no results, and they came much too late. Danijel Crljen, aware of what was 
awaiting the members of the NDH and its armed forces, concluded that these 
“last attempts intended to save the situation were not very promising.”24 
Unable to strike a deal with the advancing Allies and hard-pressed by the 
Partisans, the NDH political and army leadership discussed whether to fight 
on or retreat. One of directions for withdrawal was through Istria towards 
Italy, but A. Ljerkić argued that it would be more logical to retreat to Carinthia, 
together with the Germans “who supported the Croats in every way.”25 Those 
who supported continuing the struggle believed it would be wiser to withdraw 
to the woods and establish a resistance movement there, or to move to Istria 
and link forces with the Western Allies. However, it was unlikely that the West 
would accept and protect those who once were supported by the Germans and 
had fought with them.  Vjekoslav Luburić later commented that “there was 
no one so naïve who could have thought that the western democracies would 
do what we really wanted – supply us with artillery, tanks and airplanes – we 
needed to stop the Russians.” 26
20 B. Krizman, Ustaše i Treći Reich II, 274.
21 E. Schmidt-Richberg, Der Endkampf auf dem Balkan, 118.
22 Svetomir đukić, “Iz šume u emigraciju”, in: Povlačenje 1945. Krivci i žrtve, ed. Tomislav 
Sabljak, Ivo Smoljan, Zagreb 2000, 285-302; Hrvoje Matković, Povijest Nezavisne Države 
Hrvatske (Zagreb: Naklada Pavičić, 2002), 229-241; F. Jelić – Butić, Ustaše i Nezavisna Država 
Hrvatska 1941. – 1945., 304-306.
23 V. Vrančić, S bielom zastavom preko Alpa (u misiji Hrvatske državne vlade za predaju 
hrvatskih oružanih snaga) (Buenos Aires: “Federico Grote”, 1953). A copy of Memorandum 
was presented to Allays by captive American pilots, but offered proposal was not accepted. B. 
Krizman, Ustaše i Treći Reich II, 289-294.   
24 Danijel Crljen, “Čimbenici bleiburškog sloma”, Hrvatska revija, 1 and 2 (77 and 78) (1970): 
46-47; B. Krizman, Pavelić u bjekstvu (Zagreb: Globus, 1986), 37-38.
25 A. Ljerkić, “Od Ivan Planine do Bleiburga”, 14.
26 J. I. Prcela, D. Živić, Hrvatski holokaust, 49.
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The final decision to withdraw reopened the discussion regarding how to 
do so. Some authors think that the continuation of the conflict would have 
made the situation even more difficult,27 but most  believe that the decision 
to withdraw was wrong.28 Petar Bareza argues that Poglavnik and the govern-
ment liquidated the NDH, and that when they made that dubious decision, 
they did not think about the nation, only about the welfare of chosen individ-
uals.29 Even at the end, they claimed that they expected some “major” changes, 
or perhaps they were just misleading the public with this phraseology.30 What 
seems clear is that at the end, chaos reigned in Zagreb.
According to Vinko Nikolić, “there was something terrifying in the air … 
everybody running, not looking back, or greeting anybody … Nothing is cer-
tain. … But, it seems we are moving tonight.”31 Most of the refugees left the 
Croatian capital on May 7, after the Poglavnik and members of his govern-
ment had already taken steps to save themselves.32  Danijel Crljen recalled 
that “… numerous refugees embraced our vehicle. … As far as I could see 
the road was filled with soldiers, or civilians of both gender and different age 
….”33 Each person became “just another part of meaningless and amorphous 
mass that was moving without any will or hope.”34 Even so, the first stage of the 
withdrawal was actually conducted under some kind of control, and occurred 
without major conflicts with Parisan units,35 which had been ordered to 
advance towards Carinthia.36 But upon reaching Celje (Slovenia) Croatian 
27 A. Ljerkić, “Od Ivan Planine do Bleiburga”, 10; Zvonimir Dusper, U vrtlogu Bleiburga 
(Rijeka: Vitagraf, 2001), 201-202.
28  Dragutin Kamber, Slom NDH. Kako sam ga ja proživio (Zagreb: Hrvatski informativni cen-
tar, 1995), 33-34; Stjepan Buć, “Da li smo Hrvatsku mogli sačuvati?”, Hrvatska revija, 2-3 (1960): 
226; Josip Aleksić, “Vojnički aspekti hrvatskog povlačenja u svibnju 1945.”, in: Na prekretnici, 
no. 7, ed. Jure Petričević, Brugg 1986, 31-32; J. Aleksić, “Bleiburg”, in: 50 godina Bleiburga, ed. 
Jozo Marević, Zagreb 1995, 95. 
29 Petar Bareza, “Bleiburška katastrofa”, Hrvatska revija, 1(37) (1960): 31-43.
30 Preparing the last number of paper “Nova Hrvatska” “great news” was expected (it was 
about some members of HSS entering the government), but since it did not come the num-
ber was concluded; M. Rupić, Z. Dizdar, “Izjave zarobljenih i izručenih dužnosnika NDH”, in: 
Spomenica Bleiburg, 112.
31 Vinko Nikolić, Tragedija se dogodila u svibnju, 2 vols. (Barcelona-München: Knjižnica 
Hrvatske revije, 1984-1985 and Zagreb: Školske novine, 1995), 1:88.
32 Jere Jareb, “Sudbina posljednje hrvatske državne vlade i hrvatskih ministara iz Drugog 
svjetskog rata (Prilog za studiju o hrvatskoj državnoj vladi)”, Hrvatska revija, 2 (110) (June 
1978): 218-224. 
33 Danijel Crljen, “Bleiburg”, Hrvatska revija, 2.- 4. (Decembar 1966): 265; Bleiburška tragedi-
ja hrvatskog naroda, 263-268; Dinko Šakić, S Poglavnikom u Alpama (Split: Laus, 2001), 7-25; 
Tomislav Koševac, “Posljednja bitka”, Hrvatska revija, 2 (1983): 264.
34 S. Slipac, Svjedok. Moj križni put, 31-32.
35 Aleksandar Vojinović, “Tragični finale rata”, in: Otvoreni dossier: Bleiburg, ed. Marko Grčić, 
Zagreb 1990, 71; Nikola Pavelić, “Tragom krvi i užasa”, in: Bleiburg: uzroci i posljedice, 193; J. I. 
Prcela, D. Živić, Hrvatski holokaust, 420.
36 Milan Basta, Rat je završen 7 dana kasnije (Zagreb: Globus, 1976), 302.
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columns lost any contact with their command.37 At the same time, Partisan 
units were advancing towards Dravograd (Slovenia – Austria border),38 form-
ing a “human wall which … eliminated any possibility to proceed.”39 Despite 
determined resistance, the Partisans managed to surround the column com-
pletely.40 The retreat was coming to an end and “a major group was blocked at 
Bleiburg and some at Dravograd. A huge emigration – after eight days of wan-
dering, hunger and struggle –  arrived at Bleiburg on 15 May.”41 So the British, 
Parisan, and NDH armies met on the fields at Bleiburg.
On the evening of 14 May, a Croatian Liaison Officer arrived at the headqu-
arters of the 38th Irish Infantry Brigade and informed it that “two groups of 
Croats, each of about 100,000 men under arms,” with “about 500,000 civilians” 
were arriving in the areas.42 A British officer,  Patrick T. D. Scott, requested the 
Croats to refrain from advancing further, “because behind his units there are 
Partisans and since the night is approaching there could be incidents, which 
he certainly wants to avoid.” During this conversation the Croatian delegation 
allegedly was promised that they would be able to proceed freely on the follow-
ing day.43 It is likely that the British officer was worried over possible conflicts, 
since the Partisans were very close and ready to attack. Moreover both sides, as 
he noted, “hated each other till death”.44 Still, he notes in his diary that he was 
told by higher authority that on no account could any British officer accept 
an offer to surrender; because the Croats “had fought against the Yugoslavs in 
support of Germany and they must become Yugoslav prisoners.”45 Even major 
D. C. Owen, the head of Anglo-American army mission, said at the headquar-
ters of the Fourth Operational Zone that, “Yugoslav units are truly fighting for 
the Allies against the Axis powers.”46
Ivan Kovačić Efenka came to infantry headquarters with the same inten-
tions and probably also met with Scott to examine what was happening at 
Bleiburg.47 The final decision regarding the Croats was made the morning of 
37 D. Crljen, “Bleiburg”, Hrvatska revija, 269; A. Vojinović, “Tragični finale rata”, in: Otvoreni 
dossier: Bleiburg, 74.
38 Sreta Savić, 51 vojvođanska divizija (Beograd: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1974), 206; M. Basta, 
Rat je završio 7 dana kasnije, 324-325.
39 D. Crljen, “Bleiburg”, Hrvatska revija, 270; Jure Zovko, Križni put i dvadeset godina robi-
je (Zagreb: Globus, 1997), 17-26; J. Aleksić, “Vojnički aspekti hrvatskog povlačenja u svibnju 
1945.”, in: Na prekretnici, 42.
40 A. Ljerkić, “Od Ivan planine do Bleiburga”, 76-80; M. Basta, Rat je završen 7 dana kasni-
je, 339.
41 A. Ljerkić, “Od Ivan planine do Bleiburga”, 101.
42 Jerome Jareb, Ivo Omrčanin, “The end of the Croatian Army at Bleiburg, Austria in May 
1945 according to English Military Documents”, Journal of Croatian Studies, Vol. XVIII-XIX 
(1977-1978): 51; D. Crljen, “Bleiburg”, Hrvatska revija, 283.
43 D. Crljen, “Bleiburg”, Hrvatska revija, 283.
44 Bleiburška tragedija hrvatskog naroda, 403-404.
45 J. Jareb, I. Omrčanin, “The end of the Croatian Army at Bleiburg”, 52.
46 Petar S. Brajović, Konačno oslobođenje (Sjećanja i obrade) (Zagreb: Spektar, 1983.), 555.
47 Ibid., 559-560.
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15 May. British policy was laid out in a report by the local commander: “(a) 
National emigration in progress with the object of surrendering to British 
Army. Numbers involved about 1½ million now approaching BLEIBURG, 
including two Army Corps of approx 100.000 each, arrived but short of ammu-
nition. (b) Their surrender has been refused and they are not to cross the old 
Austrian frontier. They have been so informed and warned we intend to use 
force of arms to enforce our decision.”48 It appears that the Croatian surrender 
had already been refused during the first contacts with British Headquarters 
on 14 May. Yet Crljen recalled that the British had said the column could pro-
ceed the following day.  Indeed, according to Crljen, : “General Herenčić asked 
me to go back through column and announce the good news ….”49 It is possi-
ble that the British may have said this just to keep the Croatian troops quiet. 
The crisis reached its climax on the 15th when the Croat Liaison officer 
returned from British headquarters and reported that the British attitude had 
changed and that he had seen some Partisan officers at British Headquarters. 
Negotiations followed. Milan Basta and Ivan Kovačić-Efenka represented the 
Partisans while Ivan Herenčić, Vjekoslav Servatzy, Vladimir Metikoš, and 
Danijel Crljen represented the Croatians.  The Partisan delegates entered first, 
and Basta said that General Scott stated that “300.000 enemy soldiers” were 
facing the Partisans.  “These forces understandable would not surrender to 
you,” he said.  “They want to surrender to us, and since we are allies we will 
deal with the problem later.”50 Basta responded that the enemy forces “have no 
more than 30.000 people (I really believed that there were no more people, but 
later it was determined that just in there last group there were around 100.000 
soldiers …)”.51 Scott’s diary does not mention the exact number of enemy forc-
es; he was only informed that there were two corps of 100.000 men each.52 He 
noticed that the Partisan emissary immediately said that it had been decid-
ed “without delay to attack Croats” and that “the battle should start in a half 
an hour.” He emphasized that he had “explicit orders … to defeat the enemy 
army and force it to surrender … As a soldier,” he added, “I am obligated to do 
everything possible to carry out these orders ….”53
The British officer suggested that “the elimination of the Croatian Army, 
which no doubt was highly desirable, would be more satisfactorily achieved if 
the Croats laid down their arms.”54 He thought that it would be impossible for 
a surrender of so many people to occur in half an hour, but Basta insisted, say-
48 J . Jareb, I. Omrčanin, “The end of the Croatian Army at Bleiburg”, 25-26; Milan Blažeković, 
“Ministar i pokolji. Prilog pitanju odgovornosti za prisilno vraćanje ratnih zarobljenika poslije 
Drugog svjetskog rata”, in: Bleiburg: uzroci i posljedice, 405-406.
49  D. Crljen, “Bleiburg”, Hrvatska revija, 283.
50  M. Basta, Rat je završio 7 dana kasnije, 355.
51  Ibid., 357.
52  J. Jareb, I. Omrčanin, “The end of the Croatian Army at Bleiburg”, 53.
53  M. Basta, Rat je završio 7 dana kasnije, 357.
54  J. Jareb, I. Omrčanin, “The end of the Croatian Army at Bleiburg”, 53.
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ing that “it is important that capitulation starts as soon as possible and then it 
can last a few days if necessary.”55 Only then did the three Croatian delegates 
enter. They started by announcing that “We are here by decree of Croatian 
leader and the government offering our surrender and asking to be put in the 
custody of the Western Alliess.” Crljen noted that the “British officer  briskly 
respondeded that our surrender will not be accepted and we should be treated 
like illegal bandits because we had not surrendered our arms to the Partisans 
eight days ago, as stipulated in the truce agreement...” When Crljen noted that 
there were many civilians in the mass of refugees, Scott answered tersely that 
those were “political matters, which I as a soldier cannot discuss”. He added 
that he had orders from Field-Marshal Alexander, who had received “precise 
political instructions from Prime Minister Churchill.”56
Scott later admitted that his “additional problem was that the radio receiver 
on his vehicle, his only contact with higher authorities, was only working spo-
radically, so it was not possible to report his problem to Marshal Alexander, 
as the Croatian negotiator wanted.”57 Moreover, Scott claims that he gave the 
Croatian delegation three explicit options: “First: That they would surren-
der to the Yugoslavs [sic=Partisans]. That I would use my influence, though 
unofficially, to try and ensure that would be treated correctly. Secondly: That 
they stay where they were and be attacked by the Yugoslavs. Third: That they 
endeavor to advance into the British lines.”58 Scott sought to avoid this third 
possibility because it represented “a major political and administrative problem 
for his soldiers and him.”59 He emphasized that if the Croats should advance 
into British lines, “they would not only be attacked by the Yugoslavs, but by the 
full weight of the British and American Air Forces, land forces and everything 
else that I could get my hands on, in which case they would unquestionably 
be annihilated.” [check quote] When the Croats saw how hopeless the situa-
tion was, they “sensibly decided on the first course”. However he added “If they 
took either of the other alternatives they would be bound to die, so what?”60 
But Herenčić says that Scott’s claim that he offered the Croats three possibili-
ties  was a lie.  The Croats, Herenčić recalls, were offered only one option –“to 
lay down their arms and surrender!”61
During the final stage of negotiations, Basta stated the terms of capitulation. 
The remains of your Ustasha-Home Guard army are in a difficult situation,” 
he began. “You are surrounded by powerful forces of the Yugoslav army. … It 
is in your best interest to consent to capitulation and save all the refugees that 
moved to emigration. … An hour after you return to the units the capitulation 
55  M. Basta, Rat je završio 7 dana kasnije, 357.
56  D. Crljen, “Bleiburg”, Hrvatska revija, 287.
57  Bleiburška tragedija hrvatskog naroda, 403.
58  J. Jareb, I. Omrčanin, “The end of the Croatian Army at Bleiburg”, 54.
59  Bleiburška tragedija hrvatskog naroda, 404-405.
60  J. Jareb, I. Omrčanin, “The end of the Croatian Army at Bleiburg”, 55.
61  M. Blažeković, “Ministar i pokolji”, in: Bleiburg: uzroci i posljedice, 410-412.
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deadline begins. … Civilian refugees will be repatriated and sent home; if you 
consent to our terms, your whole army will be placed in captive camps under 
the protection of International law for human rights and protection of prison-
ers of war. …”.62 Scott thought these terms “fair enough”.63 Any Croatian hopes 
remaining disappeared when Scott turned to the Partisan officer: and said, 
“’my tanks are at your disposal.’”64 When the Croatian representative request-
ed the presence of a British commission during extradition, Scott ended the 
meeting by responding that: “you cannot demand anything. This concerns 
only our Allies, if they want us to be there”. Should the Croats not surrender 
immediately, he warned that “we will start bombing you after one hour.”65
According to the Croatian delegation there are some inaccuracies in Scott’s 
description of the “delivery agreement” to the Partisans. General Herenčić 
emphasized that it was not true that the Croats agreed to surrender to a Partisan 
commissar. “We answered to the British commissar and did not directly nego-
tiate with the Partisans.” It is quite interesting how the British describe their 
role in negotiations. They were, they insist, just intermediaries who “helped 
[facilitate] the Croatian extradition to the Yugoslavs. In that way they could 
not be considered responsible for them.”66 Herenčić recalled that partisans 
never promised anything, but that the British general had promised that the 
Croats would receive humane treatment and the Partisans would respect all 
the international rights of war prisoners and victims.67 But Scott claimed that 
“the Croatian Army was to be treated as prisoners of war with the exception of 
political criminals, who would be tried by Allied courts, while the civil popu-
lation was to be fed and returned to Croatia ...” Yet even Scott questioned the 
execution of these. But it seems that the Croatian representatives offered their 
surrender to the British, who conveyed it on to the Partisans, who accepted the 
British decision. Scott stated that the Partisans “insured him everybody will be 
repatriated and cared for. I was not sure whether they did or did not follow the 
agreement. I would not be surprised if they were all massacred.”68 
During the negotiations, reference was often made to the regulations of the 
Hague and Geneva Conventions, which determine the treatment of prisoners 
of war.69 But Allied governments which had signed the Moscow Declaration in 
62  M. Basta, Rat posle rata: Pavelićevi generali se predaju (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1963), 87-98.
63  J. Jareb, I. Omrčanin, “The end of the Croatian Army at Bleiburg”, 55.
64  M. Basta, Rat je završio 7 dana kasnije, 362-363.
65 D. Crljen, “Bleiburg”, Hrvatska revija, 292-293.
66 Darko Bekić, “‘Slučaj Bleiburg’: nova istraživanja, nova iskušenja”, Časopis za suvremenu 
povijest 21 (1989), no. 1-3: 204-205.
67 M. Blažeković, “Ministar i pokolji”, in: Bleiburg: uzroci i posljedice, 411. 
68 Bleiburška tragedija hrvatskog naroda, 405.
69 Boško Petković, ed., Međunarodne konvencije o ratnom pravu i o sigurnosti (Zagreb: 
Zavod za općenarodnu obranu i društvenu samozaštitu SRH, 1979), 337-358.; Boško Petković, 
Međunarodne konvencije o ratnom pravu (Zagreb: Sveučilišna tiskara, 21992), 398-424; Stjepan 
Hefer, “Izručivanje hrvatske vojske god. 1945. u svjetlu međunarodnog prava”, Hrvatski kalen-
dar (1955): 86-92.
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1943 had also taken a definite stand regarding the punishment of war crimes.70 
According to the Yalta Conference Declaration of 1945, the Allies had decid-
ed that all prisoners who were Soviet citizens and had belonged to enemy for-
mations supporting the Third Reich should be handed over to the country 
they had fought against. Although this agreement included only Soviet citi-
zens, it was supported by “each of Stalin’s protégés, including Josip Broz Tito”.71 
It is interesting that none of the international conventions regarding prison-
ers of war mentions whether a country has the right to repatriate prisoners 
against their will. The Geneva Convention stipulates that prisoners be protect-
ed “against acts of violence” and it represents a humane aspect in which repa-
triation represents a right, and not an obligation.72 
At Bleiburg, the issue was to settle a complicated condition in Carinthia that 
had been caused by arrival of NDH army  with many Croatian civilians and 
the Partisans in hot pursuit. Regarding the civilians, Eden wrote in his note 
to Winston Churchill that, “it seems that the ‘Anti-Titoists’ will offer ‘their 
services’ to Allied Headquarters, which could be ‘very unpleasant’. I do not 
know how we could explain collaboration with units which had been until 
now openly collaborating with the Germans ...’”. He therefore recommended 
that they should be disarmed and placed in refugee camps.73 On 3 May, after 
the proposition was accepted, 8th Army issued order no. 1465, which read in 
part that Chetniks, Mihailović’s troops, and other dissident Yugoslavs will be 
considered as surrendered personnel and will be treated as such.74 Anthony 
Crosland writes that, “When they arrived for the first time, willing to surren-
der, the staff was benevolent regarding the acceptance of the troops confront-
ed with Tito.”75 
However, after 4 May, it was clear that Partisan troops were moving towards 
Klagenfurt.76 Accordingly, Alexander informed J. B. Tito in writing that, 
“Yugoslav troops in Stiria and Carinthia can cause difficulties and make my 
mission more complicated”.77 The possibility of a conflict with the Partisans 
70 Venceslav Glišić, “Zločin i kazna”, in: Drugi svjetski rat, 3 vols. (Zagreb, Ljubljana, Beograd: 
Mladost, 1980), 3: 397-398.
71 Michael McAdams, “Yalta and The Bleiburg Tragedy”, in: Od Bleiburga do naših dana, 93-
101.
72 Vladan Jončić, Ratni zarobljenici. Međunarodnopravni status (Beograd: Vojnoizdavački 
zavod, 2002), 315-316.
73 D. Bekić, “‘Slučaj Bleiburg’: nova istraživanja, nova iskušenja”, 199-200.
74 Staniša R. Vlahović, Zbornik dokumenata iz britanske arhive. Anglo – Jugoslavenski odnosi 
1941. - 1948. (Birmingham: self publish, 1985), 352.
75 Nikolay Tolstoj, Ministar i pokolji. Bleiburg i Kočevski Rog 1945. (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod 
Matice hrvatske, 1991), 102-103.
76 Dušan Biber, “Britansko – jugoslovanski nesporazumi okrog Koroške 1944 – 1945”, 
Zgodovinski časopis 32 (1978), no 4: 480; William Deakin, “Britanci, Jugoslovani in Avstrija 
(1943 – maj 1945), Zgodovinski časopis 33 (1979), no. 1: 121.
77 D. Biber, “Međunarodni položaj Jugoslavije u poslednjoj godini drugog svetskog rata”, in: Za 
pobedu i slobodu – Završne operacije za oslobođenje Jugoslavije (učesnici govore), ed. Ivo Matović 
(Beograd: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1986), 835.
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clearly disconcerted Alexander and he entertained the idea that “it would not 
be bad if the resistance of Ustasha and White guard forces could briefly detain 
Tito around Ljubljana and Zagreb …”78 However, British soldiers were reluc-
tant to engage in conflicts with former Allies, and for some units  “those days, 
after the end of war were worse than real struggle. We had to deal with things 
that do not concern soldiers ….”79 Additionally, “Tito was considered an Ally, 
although he caused his the Allies a great deal of trouble.”80
The British historian Nikolai Tolstoy noticed “anomalies”, regarding the 
problem of extradition of many Soviet citizens and “Yugoslavs”.81 He conclud-
ed that there was a “Klagenfurt conspiracy” in which the later premier Harold 
Macmillan played a major part. 82As evidence, Tolstoy notes that on 12 May, 
in agreement with Alexander, Macmillan departed for the Headquarters of 8th 
Army and the 13th Corp. His main intention was to “put Generals McCreery 
and Harding fully in the picture”.83 After that, allegedly on his own initiative, 
he met with General Keightley in Klagenfurt.84 The most probable motive for 
his journey was that “thousands of so-called Ustashi or Chetniks mostly with 
wives and children are fleeing in panic into this area in front of the advanc-
ing Yugoslavs. These expressions, Ustashi and Chetnik, cover anything from 
guerilla forces raised by the Germans from Slovenes and Croats and Serbs to 
fight Tito, and armed and maintained by the Germans – to people who, either 
because they are Roman Catholics or Conservative in politics, or for whatev-
er cause are out of sympathy with revolutionary Communism and therefore 
labeled as Fascists or Nazis. ….”85
Macmillan also discussed “Yugoslavs” who had already surrendered to the 
British units.86  According to Tolstoy, the alleged visit resulted in a major poli-
cy change concerning the Yugoslavs, given the fact that Keightley was willing, 
in accordance with the Allied Headquarters command of 3 May, to send them 
to safety. But the next day, 13 May, Macmillan held a meeting with General 
Robertson, Alexander’s Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), who requested 
78 D. Biber, “Britansko – jugoslovanski nesporazumi okrog Koroške 1944 – 1945”, 479.
79 Nicholas Bethell, “Zašto su Englezi izručili zarobljenike”, Nova Hrvatska, 9 (19 May 1975): 
12-14; Borivoje M. Karapandžić, Jugoslovensko krvavo proleće 1945. Titovi Katini i Gulazi 
(Kleveland: (s.n., 1976 and Beograd: Mladost, 1990), 232-237.
80 B. M. Karapandžić, Jugoslavensko krvavo proleće 1945, 233-237.
81 Nikolai Tolstoy, Victims of Yalta (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977 and Corgi Books 
1986).
82 N. Tolstoy, “The Klagenfurt Conspiracy. War Crimes & Diplomatic Secrets”, Encounter, 
LX/5 (1983); N. Tolstoy, Celoveška zarota. Vojni zločini in diplomatske tajnosti (Celovec: 
Mohorjeva založba, 1986); N. Tolstoj, Matjaž Klepec, Tomaž Kovač, Trilogija o poboju vojnih 
beguncev iz leta 1945. Vetrinj – Teharje – Rog (Maribor: ZAT, 1991), 13-37; N. Tolstoy, “Verzija 
grofa Nikolaia Tolstoya”, in: Otvoreni dossier: Bleiburg, 121-193.
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Washington’s approval so he could send a telegram to the CG British 8th Army 
commander, empowering him to “turn over to Yugoslav Partisans a large 
number of dissident Yugoslav troops with the exception of Chetniks”. He stat-
ed that “Macmillan, who talked with the CG Eight Army yesterday, had rec-
ommended this course of action. … the CAO expressed disappointment that 
we did not seem to agree with him on this point but added that he was faced 
with a grave administrative problem with hundreds of thousands of German 
POWS on his hands and could not be bothered at the same time about who 
might or might not be turned over to the Russians and Partisans to be shot.”87 
Joseph Grew, the  Acting Secretary of State for the United States., pointed out: 
“… that such contemplated violation of agreed Anglo-American policy cannot 
be justified on grounds of administrative expediency.”88  The Cowgill report,89 
which was issued as a reaction of the British government to Tolstoy’s research, 
does not mention these documents and the protests of American officials and 
so conceals the apparent discord in making decisions.90
What is beyond doubt is that on 14 May Robertson ordered: that “all Russians 
should be handed over to the Soviet forces ….” He also ordered that “all sur-
rendered personnel of established Yugoslav nationality who were serving in 
German forces should be disarmed and handed over to Yugoslav forces.”91 It 
is interesting to note in which way this formulation tended to differentiate 
Yugoslav captives.   On 14 May, the 5th Corps received a note about the arrival 
of new refugees. British sources reported that there were “300.000 PW surren-
dered personnel and refugees in Corps area. a further 600.000 reported mov-
ing North to Austria from Yugoslavia. should this number materialize food 
and guard situation will become critical.”92 When he forwarded this report, 
McCreery requested that Keightley “take over formed bodies and disarm them 
as they cross the border … Suggest Croats become Tito’s show”.93 On 15 May 
field marshal Alexander sent a massage to the 8th Army saying: “approximately 
200.000 Yugoslav nationals who were serving in German armed forces surren-
dered to him. We should like to turn these over immediately to Marshal Tito’s 
forces.”94 The agreement reached on 15 May between brigadier-general Toby 
Law (Lord Aldington), who was in charge of the refugees in camp Viktring, 
87 Ibid., 79.
88 Ibid., 117.
89 Anthony Cowgill, Christopher Booker, lord Thomas Brimelow, Teddy Tryon-Wilson, 
Interim Report on Am Enquiry Into the repatriation of Surrendered Enemy Personnel to the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia From Austria in May 1945 and the Alleged ‘Klagenfurt Conspiracy’ 
(London, September 1988); D. Bekić, “‘Slučaj Bleiburg’: nova istraživanja, nova iskušenja”, 197-
214; D. Bekić, “Verzija Cowgillova izvještaja ”, in: Otvoreni dossier: Bleiburg, 27-68.
90 D. Bekić, “‘Slučaj Bleiburg’: nova istraživanja, nova iskušenja”, 212-213.
91 N. Tolstoy, The Minister and the Massacres, 91-92; S. R. Vlahović, Zbornik dokumenata iz 
britanske arhive, 355-356.
92 N. Tolstoy, The Minister and the Massacres, 100.
93 Ibid., 100, 113; D. Bekić, “‘Slučaj Bleiburg’: nova istraživanja, nova iskušenja”, 204.
94 N. Tolstoy, The Minister and the Massacres, 113. 
39
Review of Croatian History 2/2006, no.1, 27 - 46
and commissar Hočevar from the Yugoslav 9th Corp. followed the latter agree-
ment.95 In a memo addressed to general Eisenhower, Alexander states: “the 
most important thing for me is to clear up my communication lines from this 
burden. Army efficiency of my units is significantly disturbed […].”96
So it seems clear that the British were anxious to rid themselves of the 
Croats.  Yet Tolstoy constantly justifies Alexander’s role and its significance 
in this situation; arguing that he was wrongly informed about the mass of 
military and civilians refugees, who had already surrendered to the British 
troops. According to Tolstoy, there could not be any extradition, mak-
ing his order “inoperative” and creating a “nonexistent surrender” to which 
Robertson’s order from 14 May referred. Finally, Tolstoy concludes that it is 
hard to determine “to what extent the misunderstanding represented a genu-
ine error, and to what extent a deception profiting from it.”97 Another view on 
Alexander’s responsibility is offered in a letter from R. M. B. Chevallier (Head 
of the Southern Section of the Foreign Office).  Sent on 11 September 1951, 
it says that the extraditions were carried out “by the order of Supreme Allied 
Commander for the Mediterranean, based on the fact that those people were 
fighting on German side against Allied units of Marshal Tito and therefore 
will be treated as war prisoners.”98
After the “critical period” had past, on 17 May Alexander issued a new 
order. According to it, the Chetniks and other Yugoslav dissidents should 
be treated like disarmed enemy units and evacuated in British concentra-
tion zone Distone. In a second telegram sent to Combined Chiefs of Staff, 
Alexander asked for guidelines regarding the final disposition of “50.000 
Cossacks including 11.000 women, children and old men; present estimate of 
total 35.000 Chetniks – 11.000 of them already evacuated to Italy – and 25.000 
German and Croat units.” In each of above cases “return them to their country 
of origin immediately might be fatal to their health.”99  
The agreement regarding the repatriation of refugees under Allied protec-
tion was accepted on 15 May, although the operation started four days later. 
In spite of Alexander’s clear prohibition of repatriation, brigade command-
er Law issued a secret order on 17 May which read, : “All Yugoslav nation-
als at present in Corps area will be handed over to Tito forces as soon as pos-
sible. these units will be disarmed immediately but will NOT be told of their 
destination.”100 Although it was specified that they should not be informed of 
their destination, they were told that they were moving to Italy by trains.101 
95 Ibid., 115.
96 D. Bekić, “‘Slučaj Bleiburg’: nova istraživanja, nova iskušenja”, 208.
97 N. Tolstoy, The Minister and the Massacres, 114.
98 D. Bekić, “‘Slučaj Bleiburg’: nova istraživanja, nova iskušenja”, 213; Christopher Booker, A 
Looking-Glass Tragedy. The controversy over the repatriations from Austria in 1945. (London: 
Duckworth, 1997), passim.
99 N. Tolstoy, The Minister and the Massacres, 124-125.
100 Ibid., 138; S. R. Vlahović, Zbornik dokumenata iz britanske arhive, 357. 
101 N. Tolstoy, The Minister and the Massacres, 139.
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Colonel Robin Rose Price commented that this was an order of “… most sin-
ister duplicity i.e. to send Croats to their foes i.e. Tito to Yugoslavia under the 
impression they were to go to Italy.”102 When Lord Aldington was asked why 
the refugees were told they were moving to Italy, he answered: “It was not me 
who told them so. My order was explicit – they should not be told of their des-
tination …I do not know. All I know is that these rumors were spread around. 
Nobody knows, neither did the trial establish who gave this information to the 
Yugoslavs ….”103 Nevertheless, numerous memoirs confirm quite the opposite. 
“The Croats have been given no warning of their fate” “and are being allowed 
to believe that their destination is not Yugo-Slavia, but Italy, until the actual 
moment of their handover.”104 Leaving the camp, even the British colonel gave 
a speech emphasizing that in Italy they would be “reformed and dressed in 
new uniforms and trained for new tasks.”105 The same promises were given to 
the Serbs and Slovenians whose extraditions started on 23 May. The following 
day, while waiting for the transports, lieutenant-colonel Radoslav Tatalović 
asked a British major, “Mr. Major where are we going?” The major answered: 
“To your units in Italy.”  We have your word of honor?,” Tatlovic asked.   “You 
have my word of honor!,” the major replied.106
 On 19 May, General Keightley and Colonel Ivanović from the 3rd 
Partisan army discussed the repatriation of the remaining Slovenians and 
Serbs. They agreed that the evacuation of Yugoslav troops from Austrian ter-
ritory should start no later than 21 May at 7 p.m.107 According to the agree-
ment, the 5th Corps. was assigned to turn over to Tito’s forces [?] “all Yugoslav 
Nationals now in the Corps area who had been fighting in uniform with the 
Germans and their camp followers.”108 Under these circumstances, it may seem 
that prisoners were extradited in order to assure that Partisans forces with-
drew from Carinthia. However, available documents do not support this the-
ory, and this thesis is therefore not accepted in the literature.109 Indeed, the 
102  Ibid., 133.
103  “Lord Aldington protiv grofa Tolstoya”, Start, 20 January 1990, p. 50.
104 N. Tolstoy, The Minister and the Massacres, 133; J. I. Prcela – D. Živić, Hrvatski holokaust, 
306.
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(Chicago: Croatian Franciscan Press, 1961), 30-31; In Tito’s Death Marches and Extermination 
Camps  (New York: Carlton Press, 1962), 24-25.
106  B. M. Karapandžić, Jugoslavensko krvavo proleće 1945., 33-34; Vetrinjska tragedija. V spo-
min nesmrtnim junakom, izdanim u Vetrinju od 27. – 31. maja 1945. in pomorjenim za velike 
ideje svobode (Cleveland: Zveza slovenskih protikomunističnih borcev, 1960 and Ljubljana 
1991), 34.
107  Zdravko Dizdar, Vladimir Geiger, Milan Pojić, Mate Rupić, ed., Partizanska i komunistička 
represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944. – 1946. Dokumenti (Slavonski Brod: Hrvatski institut za 
povijest - Podružnica za povijest Slavonije, Srijema i Baranje, 2005), 126-127.
10 8 N. Tolstoy, The Minister and the Massacres, 140.
109  Jera Vodušek Starič, Prevzem oblasti 1944 – 1946 (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založaba, 1992), 237.
41
Review of Croatian History 2/2006, no.1, 27 - 46
order regarding the extradition was reached two days before the agreement 
with the Partisans was signed.110 
 Furthermore, as Tolstoy writes, Alexander did not know about 
the extraditions until 21 May. On the same day, McCreery asked in writing 
about the treatment of armed and civilian groups of different nationalities 
and whether it was possible to send a deputy who could help to find a solu-
tion.111 This request for new instructions seams a odd, especially given that 
it was already clear on 19 May who will be extradited. Alexander respond-
ed that, “No Yugoslavs who have come into the hands of Allied Troops will 
be returned direct to Yugoslavia or handed over to Yugoslav Troops against 
their will.” Those who were fighting against Tito had to be treated like prison-
ers of war or surrendered enemy soldiers, while all others had to be classified 
as refugees and settled in refugee camps in Italy.112 Nonetheless, McCreery for-
warded an order requiring an extradition of Yugoslav citizens. It is interesting 
that regarding the extradition of Yugoslavs after the 23 May even the Cowgill 
report states that there was a “contradiction between what the 5th Corp thought 
should be done and of what the higher command, up to AFHQ in Caserta, was 
aware and capable to approve at that level.”113 Although Tolstoy concludes that 
“there were individuals who had more possibilities than McCreery to under-
stand what is happening”, it is not possible to evade the question of who was 
responsibile.114
Allied Headquarters, answered Alexander’s request of 26 May and ordered 
that Cossacks should be handed over to the Soviets. Regarding the Chetniks, 
they agreed that they should not be extradited to Yugoslavia. However, they 
considered the troops of the NDH to be part of “… the regular forces of a 
quisling government operating under German direction.” … Consequently, 
Allied Headquarters believed that, “We should therefore be in favor of hand-
ing the Croat troops in Austria over to Tito’s forces. Such a move would cer-
tainly please Tito and would show him that in some matters at any rate we are 
willing to treat him as a regular and responsible ally.”115 If the USA govern-
ment was not pleased with those recommendations, they would agree to treat 
Croat prisoners of war like Chetniks.
But the Americans did protest,116 and on 4 July the final order reversed 
the earlier decision.  It read in part that, “1) Yugoslavs should not be repa-
triated in Yugoslavia or handed over to partisan troops against their will. 2) 
The Yugoslavs fighting against Tito will be treated like displaced persons and 
be transported at disposal to camp Viktring. […] 3) All those people will be 
110  N. Tolstoy, The Minister and the Massacres, 142.
111  Ibid., 147.
112  Ibid., 150.
113  Darko Bekić, “‘Slučaj Bleiburg’: nova istraživanja, nova iskušenja”, 213.
114  N. Tolstoy, The Minister and the Massacres, 153.
115  Ibid., 126.
116  Ibid., 126.
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considered like displaced persons and finally be transferred to Italy.”117 The 
Cowgill Report noted that this decision represented the final act and conclud-
ed the “Bleiburg case”.118 Tolstoy concludes that there are not enough facts for a 
definite conclusion.[?] Nevertheless, his studies represent the only comprehen-
sive investigation about the extraditions after the World War II. The  Cowgill 
Report, as a “… private inquiry ... conducted in absence of official investiga-
tion”119 and sponsored by British Ministry of defense, looks only at “the oper-
ative necessity”, and assigns all responsibility to people low in the diplomatic 
and army hierarchies. Unfortunately, we currently lack the sources needed to 
offer more daring conclusions regarding who was to blame.
Following capitulation soldiers were released from their oaths, and . each 
person sought to save himself, often not knowing to whom he was surren-
dering.120 Milan Basta recalls that,: “Enemy soldiers acted like they were rac-
ing who will surrender first.”121 But it is questionable whether it was really like 
that, especially given that most memoirs report that prisoners did not hoist 
white flags until the agreed deadlines. In fact, Partisans “fired machine guns 
and mortars on the Ustasha column from our positions. The attack lasted for 
about fifteen to twenty minutes and only then Ustasha’s hoisted white flags 
[…].”122 According to available documentation two battalions started firing, 
killing at least sixteen people. Apparently, no artillery was involved, so “this, 
so-called, massacre was carried out by fire arms. I always said we had ideal 
positions, short distance and a great mass in front of us...”123
It seems that the surrender deadline was postponed while “British tanks sit-
uated on the north part of the valley assaulted the Ustashas compelling them to 
withdraw and surrender … ‘these actions’ shocked Slovenian Partisans “even 
though they hated the traitors’”.124 Zvonimir Zorić testifies about the British 
presence on the northern side of the field, but does not mention anyone resist-
ing there, while “down in the valley was a real hell. Constant fire from thou-
sand of different calibers was accompanied with scaring scream of wounded, 
woman and children together with horse’s neighing. Dead and wounded peo-
ple were falling down as sheaves.”125 Given conflicting and partial accounts, it 
is impossible to determine what really happened on Bleiburg field or wheth-
er people hoisted their flags on time. But it is highly probable that there were 
victims in these conflicts, even though it is impossible to establish exactly how 
many people died on Bleiburg field.  
117  Vetrinjska tragedija, 47-48. 
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295; Oton Knezović, Pokolj hrvatske vojske 1945. Dokumenti o zvjerstvima Srba nad Hrvatima 
(Chicago, 1960), 9. 
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124 Ibid, 81-82; M. Basta, Rat posle rata, 381; Bleiburška tragedija hrvatskog naroda, 329.
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The “Ways of the Cross”
Basta claims that he ordered the members of the 12th Proletarian Brigade to 
“…prepare soldiers on strict army discipline.”  They were to “…issue explic-
it orders explaining to their soldiers there must not be any mistakes handling 
the captives. … Let them explain to their intimates that our government will 
examine the degree of each person’s guilt and that those, who had spilt inno-
cent blood would be accused in front of the People’s Court and adequately 
punished.”126 In a similar vein, on 13 May Tito allegedly sent a dispatch to the 
General Staff of Croatia and Slovenia, as well as to the Staffs of their armies, 
asking them to undertake “the most stringent measures and by all means to 
prevent our units, some groups, or individuals killing the prisoners of war and 
captives. If there were people, among the prisoners and captives who might be 
guilty of war crimes, they should be handed over to army courts because of 
further processing.”127 
However, this dispatch is available only as a transcript, and when Brigadier-
General Anthony Cowgill and Nikolai Tolstoy analyzed it, the latter noted that 
it did not bear Tito’s signature and concluded that it was an obvious forgery.128 
The dispatch is not published in collections of the Yugoslav Army, and the 
only available version is an instruction from 29 April, issued by the 3rd army 
and forwarded to the 16th Division General Staff, because a similar order from 
6 December 1944 129 was not executed properly. So it was once again requested 
that prisoners should be treated according to international humanitarian law. 
For each violation of these rights the responsible individuals were to be “most 
severely handled”.130 But the available documents do not support these allega-
tions, while numerous memoirs describing the “death marches,” regardless of 
their limitations and prejudices, indicate that the Partisans sought to solve the 
problem of the many captives extradited by the British army quickly. The pris-
oners were just “a large, nameless, amorphous mass which should have been 
diminished, as much as possible, regardless of the consequences.”131 
However, Milan Basta reports that on 16 May “Home guard members and 
civilians” had already been released to their homes.132 But it appears that these 
were isolated, individual cases.  Mostof the prisoners were organized in “four-
row columns” and forced to march [to where?why, i.e., what was the ostensible 
126 M. Basta, Rat posle rata, 99.
127 VA VII, Beograd, A. NOB, reg. br. 9-22/10; Pero Damjanović, ed., J. B. Tito, Sabrana 
djela 28 (Beograd: Komunist, 1988), 43. In the footnote it is indicated that Tito issued similar 
instructions many times during the war. Most of them in situations when it increased possibil-
ity of revenge by the members of NOVJ. 
128 N. Tolstoy, “Povijest pred sudom”, Start, 6 January 1990, p. 51.
129 The order dated 5 December, 1944 has been published in: Pero Damjanović, ed., J. B. Tito, 
Sabrana djela 25 (Beograd: Komunist, 1982.), 82.
130 Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944. – 1946., 100.
131 Tomislav Brozović, “Na cesti Dravograd – Maribor”, Forum, 4-6 (April – June 1998): 709. 
132 đurica Labović, Milan Basta, Partizani za pregovaračkim stolom 1941. -1945. (Zagreb: 
Naprijed, 1986), 325.
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reason for the march?]. An especially hard stage of this forced march was the 
section between Dravograd and Maribor.133 On the afternoon of 16 May, Basta 
had left for Maribor, where he arrived after three hours. He reported that the 
“column from Dravograd to Maribor was almost 60 km long.”134 [can you do 
a rough estimate of how many people would be in a column this long if they 
were four abreast, e.g., one meter for every four people, so 1000x4=4,000 per 
km x 60=240,000 people?]  
During the “death marches” the captives were forced to walk as far as to 
the Romanian border (a distance of roughly 500 km), the Partisans execut-
ed thousands of prisoner without trial. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
many witnesses describe how the scores of captives were driven by trucks to 
improvised scaffolds. The same scenario was repeated in Tezno, Pohorje, and 
Kočevski Rog. “We were lined up on the edge of a deep pit. In a moment the 
firing of accompanied by machine gun began and I felt a strong twitch of wire 
around my wrist. Through the flashes and the firing I fell in a deep dark pit.”135 
Zdenko Zavadlav confirms this account. “Tonight we were shooting at Pohorje 
again! … they removed the prisoners from the trucks and forced them to walk 
towards the open grave. … Five by five  they were dragged to the front of the 
pit and shot at from both sides by machine guns. The victims were falling into 
the pit […] Serial killing is resuming.”136 
Those who survived continued their journey through Yugoslavia. Prisoners 
were thirsty, but around every well along the way there were many corpses, so 
nobody dared to stop to drink.137 Along the way guards took all of the pris-
oners’ possessions and often even their clothes.138 It is often said that it was 
particularly hard passing through the Serbian villages, were the residents pre-
pared a “warm welcome” for the Croatian prisoners. 
Even after the official amnesty of 3 August, 1945, Croatian prisoners were 
sent to camps. According to the testimonies by witnesses and participants, 
there was a great difference between what was proscribed by regulations and 
what was done in the field. Enough leeway was left for “revolutionary justice” 
133 Z. Zorić, “Dravogradski most – srijeda, 16. svibnja 1945. god. u svitanje dana”, in: 50 godi-
na Bleiburga, 286-287; Zvonimir Brdarić, “Moj put u nepoznato – Bleiburg, 1945.”, in: đuro 
Mikašek, Našička spomenica 1941. – 1945. (Našice: DRV Hrvatski domobran, 1997), 164.
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135 Z. Dusper, U vrtlogu Bleiburga, 33-34; B. M. Karapandžić, Jugoslavensko krvavo proleće 
1945., 227-228; J. I. Prcela, D. Živić, Hrvatski holokaust, 294.
136 Zdenko Zavadlav, Iz dnevniških zapiskov mariborskega oznovca (Izbrani listi) 1. del: Leto 
1945. (Maribor: ZAT, 1990), 91-93.
137 J. I. Prcela, D. Živić, Hrvatski holokaust, 224; Mato Šaravanja, “Kako su nas desetkovali”, in: 
Bleiburg: uzroci i posljedice, 250; Bleiburška tragedija hrvatskog naroda, 358.
138 M. Šaravanja, “Kako su nas desetkovali”, in: Bleiburg: uzroci i posljedice, 249; Bleiburška 
tragedija hrvatskog naroda, 350; J. I. Prcela, D. Živić, Hrvatski holokaust, 232, 263; Mate 
Šimundić, Hrvatski smrtni put (Split: Matica Hrvatska, 2001), 387; Josip Kereži, “Od Bleiburga 
do Velesa”, in: Od Bleiburga do naših dana, 190; Nikola Mulanović, “Nas su ubijali komunisti!”, 
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(not without at least the tacit approval of the political elite), in order to take 
revenge on those who had a “different opinion:”139 “The hatred towards the 
enemy was evident during the punishment of Ustasha and Chetnick crimi-
nals. The soldiers did not kill the captives only because of the instructions, but 
because they hated them too.”140 
The number of victims of those vengeful operations is still an open ques-
tion.141 Estimates of between 200,000 and 600,000 victims are probably? 
Certainly? exaggerated.142 Some have pared their estimates to between 100.000 
and 150.000 victims.143 According to published documents of the People’s 
Liberation War (NOR - Narodno-oslobodilački rat), in May 1945 military and 
civilian prisoners of war numbered at least “105,000 Germans, Ustashas and 
Chetniks; 25,000 people were murdered and 4,000 wounded.” From those 
prisoners, 40,000 were Germans, around 60,000 Ustasha and Home Guard 
Units, and approximately 5,000 Chetnik members.144 Most of these reports do 
not go further than 15 May, so it makes it impossible to determine the num-
ber who perished with any accuracy. The same partial estimates are notice-
able in Petar Brajović and Milan Basta.145  Ivan Dolničar estimates that 341.000 
enemy soldiers were captured and that 100.000 t died in the final Yugoslav 
offensive.146 But most of these allegations are not supported by a systematic 
investigation of documents, although Vladimir Žerjavić offers a demograph-
ic analysis.147 Based on the population censuses from 1931 and 1948, and on 
a statistical assessment of expected population growth, Žerjavić concludes 
139 Zorica Stipetić, “O Titu u povijesti i posebno u hrvatskoj povijesti”, Hrvatska ljevica, 1(31 
January 2004): 14.
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that, only around 75,000 army personnel and 45,000 civilians arrived at the 
Austrian border, and that the advance of the Yugoslav army in 1945 result-
ed in the disarming of only part of the NDH forces.148 He believes the largest 
number of victims occurred during the “death marches”, during which 26,500 
soldiers and 6,800 civilians perished. He estimates that in actions before the 
surrender, 11,600 people lost their lives, with another 12,000 interned in the 
camp at Viktring.149 Although his research is still an estimate and the numbers 
may appear small compared to earlier estimates, Žerjavić’s study is the most 
precise and most widely accepted analysis to date.150 
Historiographische Kontroversen um Bleiburg und Totenmarsch
Zusammenfassung
In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden manche interessante Fragen und Meinungsver-
schiedenheiten in Bezug auf die Ereignisse vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges unter-
sucht. Bleiburg und Totenmarsch (in kroatischer Historiographie und Öffentlichkeit 
wird der Begriff “Kreuzweg“ verwendet) stellen eines der emotionalen Themen der 
neueren kroatischen, slowenischen, serbischen, bosnisch-herzegowinischen und 
mazedonischen Historiographie dar. Dieses, obwohl sehr kurzes Zeitalter, verfügt 
über viele Unbekanntheiten, die die kroatische Historiographie in den letzten fünfzehn 
Jahren nicht im Stande zu lösen ist, oder vielleicht nicht lösen will. Die objektiven, 
erschwerenden Umstände gehen aus der Tatsache hervor, dass über die erwähn- 
ten Ereignisse wenig Archivstoff zur Verfügung steht, sondern im Gegenteil, nur 
reichhaltige, untereinander widersprüchliche  Memoirenliteratur. Ihre Herkunft, 
d.h. ob sie von Emigrantenprovenienz ist oder aus der “offiziellen“ jugoslawischen 
Historiographie stammt, beeinflusst in vielerlei Hinsicht auch ihren Inhalt. Die neuer-
en Untersuchungen zeigten eine gewisse Initiative, aber ohne bedeutende Fortschritte. 
Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass eine große Anzahl von Fragen den künfti-
gen Untersuchungen überlassen bleibt, obwohl es manchmal scheint, dass keine 
Antworten bald zu erwarten sind. 
148 Ibid., 82.
149 Boro Jurković, “Verzija grofa Nikolaia Tolstoya”, in: Otvoreni dossier: Bleiburg, 192.
150 Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941 – 1945. Occupation and collabo-
ration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 743.
